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Abstract: Meaning understood in terms of teachability and learnability is crucial 
to Wittgenstein’s later work.  As regards the resolution of philosophical 
problems – and epistemological problems in particular  - this approach seems to 
posit a hierarchy of meaning that excludes endless deferral. This is the basis of 
Wittgenstein’s attack on philosophical scepticism. Derrida’s approach to 
language seems to require both non-hierarchy and endless deferral. 
Consequently fundamental to his concept of origin is identity and difference 
simultaneously, irreducibly, non-simply.  One question is whether it is possible 
for there to be a compromise between the two philosophers: a hierarchy of 
meaning that does not in principle exclude endless deferral.  
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It cannot be gainsaid that both Wittgenstein and Derrida share a common 
preoccupation with language. Wittgenstein, especially the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus, belongs to a specifically Austrian tradition of 'language-consciousness' 
traceable back - through one of his own contemporaries Karl Kraus - to the first 
half of the nineteenth century. This essentially literary tradition was combined in 
the Tractatus with the language of propositional and predicate logic, a language 
whose source could be traced back to another Austrian, Gottlieb Frege. (Frege's 
own intellectual context may be said to be the no less indigenous Austrian 
scientific tradition of the second half of the same century: the work of Brentano 
and his successor Ernst Mach at the University of Vienna. Brentano's guiding 
 
 
philosophical principle was Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientia 
naturalis est: the true method of philosophy is none other than that of natural 
science).  If anything, the later Wittgenstein  is even more focussed on language: 
instead of objective scientific language as the only meaningful language, it was 
now merely one of many.   Wittgenstein now affirmed a plurality of 'language-
games'.  
What of Derrida in this respect? Language too is uppermost in his 
philosophy. His influences have been Nietzsche, Heidegger, and various forms 
of structuralist thought, especially that of  the linguist Ferdinand Saussure. 
Derrida maintains that both phonetic and conceptual systems are systems of 
differences. What defines an 'a' as an a in a phonetic system is its difference from 
other phonemes within the system, rather than intrinsic characters of the sound. 
Derrida extends this insight to conceptual schemes. A concept is defined by its 
differences, hence a conceptual system is a system of differences. The concept a is 
defined in terms of everything else in the system, that which is not a, (a is 
precisely not-not a).  (Though Derrida shares a common legacy with 'objective' 
structuralists such as Roland Barthes who also stands in the tradition of 
Saussure, Derrida's attitude to language is - in virtue of the method of 
deconstruction -  commonly defined as post-structuralist. Wittgenstein as will be 
seen is a form of ‘structuralism’ in the broadest sense of the term.)  
However, the shared concern Derrida has with Wittgenstein as regards 
language has seemed to go deeper than a mere common focus on language. It is 
not only that Wittgenstein affirmed a plurality of 'language-games', it is that he 
took this to mean that no one 'game' assumed priority over another.  Here, it 
could be said, is a basic affinity with Derrida: Wittgenstein's conception of the 
relations between language games is decidedly non-hierarchical; Derrida's 
conception of deconstruction presupposes non-hierarchy in its very performance.   
It seems to me that it is clear that Wittgenstein affirmed a plurality of 
language-games; what seems much more doubtful is the claim that he affirmed a 
non-hierarchical relationship between one language-game and another. Indeed, I 
would argue that Wittgenstein would have said that, to say that the relation 
between one language-game and another was either hierarchical or non-
hierarchical, did not itself make sense. It was simply not the kind of thing one 
said of language-games: they could neither be said to justify or not justify each 
other. This becomes especially evident when we consider the examples of 
language-games that Wittgenstein actually gave. According to the list outlined in  
paragraph 23 of the Philosophical Investigations it seems clear that he meant by the 
term ‘language-game’, simple everyday activities  such as: giving orders, and 
 
 
obeying them, reporting an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, etc.1 He did 
not mean that science was one language-game, religion another, politics another, 
and so on, all existing in a non-hierarchical relationship.2  I am not saying that 
this position is not valid; I am simply saying that it is unlikely that Wittgenstein 
held it.  
That the above most accurately reflects Wittgenstein’s conception of 
language-games  - language-games can neither be said to be hierarchical or non-
hierarchical as regards each other - does not rule out, and indeed allows for, a 
very interesting possibility. The way is open to argue that in the arguments of the 
later Wittgenstein there is, precisely, the pervasive presence of hierarchy. This is 
what I intend to do in what follows. I will  suggest that there is a fundamental 
dissimilarity between Wittgenstein and Derrida on the question of hierarchy. 
Specifically, I wish to demonstrate that the later Wittgenstein's and Derrida's 
respective accounts of language - their respective philosophies of language if you 
will - cannot be rendered compatible. I will argue that one cannot without 
inconsistency affirm both Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian scepticism and 
Derrida's deconstructive approach to language. The fundamental reason is that 
Derrida rejects hierarchy, Wittgenstein not. The reason for this is that the latter’s 
dialectic employs a teachability-learnability criterion that is at the heart of his 
approach both to scepticism and to meaning per se. The paper essentially 
comprises of three sections. I first examine Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian 
scepticism. Then I juxtapose Derrida’s concept of différance and deconstruction. 
Following this I discuss the implications of Wittgenstein's critique of Descartes 
for his relation to Derrida. In the course of these sections I hope to show that: 
Wittgenstein's critique of Cartesian scepticism presupposes hierarchy; Derrida's 
deconstructive critique of language affirms non-hierarchy.  I conclude from this 
that Wittgenstein and Derrida cannot be reconciled on the question of hierarchy. 
On the wider issue of whether the later Wittgenstein necessarily rejected the 
Derridian notion of endless deferral on the grounds that it precluded teachability 
and learnability of meaning per se I propose an ‘agnostic’ answer.  I conclude 
that, while his position on matters epistemological in On Certainty appears to do 
so, the evidence in, for example, Zettel, on the question of language-learning per 
se is not necessarily clear-cut. This remains so even if the resources constituting 
teachability and learnability criteria necessarily originate in what Wittgenstein 
calls ‘forms of life.’  In a concluding section I explore the implications of my 
                                                 
1 Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, edited by G E M Anscombe, (Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1953). 
2 For a summary of the literature on this point, see Fergus Kerr, Theology After 
Wittgenstein (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1999), 64-66. 
 
 
framework for understanding the relation between Wittgenstein, Derrida and 
Descartes in the context of the history of ideas.  
 
 
WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN SCEPTICISM 
 
Let me start with Descartes. Descartes' 'project of pure enquiry' was motivated by 
a desire to put the science of his day on a firm foundation.3 As if in anticipation 
of the later Enlightenment philosophers who drew extensively from the legacy of 
the Greek and Roman ideals of classical antiquity,4 Descartes' Meditations was 
influenced by the arguments of the ancient Sceptics and Sextus Empiricus in 
particular.5 Descartes sought to establish - as against the Sceptics -  truths about 
which there could not be the slightest doubt.6  To this end, he began by rejecting 
as absolutely false everything which he should have the slightest cause to doubt. 
He 'doubts everything' until he reaches a proposition about which he cannot 
have the slightest doubt: a truth that is indubitable or absolutely certain.  For 
Descartes, to say that one should only accept that about which one has not the 
slightest cause to doubt entails that one might be not be certain about anything: 
one might not know anything at all.  
It is precisely on this point that Wittgenstein takes issue in the 
posthumously published On Certainty.7 In order to conceive of the possibility of 
the meaningfulness of doubt one has to have a criterion of non-doubt - certainty - 
against which to measure what it is one conceives as doubt. "If you tried to doubt 
everything you would not get so far as doubting anything. The game of doubting 
                                                 
3 Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
1968), 95. See also J. L. Watling, "Descartes", in D. J. O'Connor (ed.), A Critical 
History of Western Philosophy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 171. 
4 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment vol i (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 9-10; 31-
203. 
5 E. M. Curley, Descartes Against the Sceptics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978); R. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (Assen: 
Van Goram, 1964), 172-192. 
6 The first of Descartes' Meditations is in fact a rehash of ancient scepticism. M. 
Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley 
Missed", in G. Vesey (ed.), Idealism Past and Present. Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Lecture Series: 13. Supplement to Philosophy 1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 45. 
7 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G E M Anscombe and G H von Wright, 
translated by  Denis Paul and  G E M Anscombe, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969). 
 
 
itself presupposes certainty." (OC 115) "To be sure, there is justification; but 
justification comes to an end." (Ibid., § 192) "Doesn't testing come to an end?" 
(Ibid., § 164) Wittgenstein says "This statement appeared to me fundamental; if it 
is false, what are `true' or `false' any more?" (Ibid., § 514) It is not a question of 
having the right not to doubt, as if one's claim to know had justified one 
suspending one's willing faculty; rather, doubt only works in context of what it is 
to be certain about something - just as being wrong can only make sense against 
a criterion of what it is to be right, and just as miscalculating can only make sense 
against the criterion of a correct calculation. Justification - and criticism - comes 
to an end not because we reach rock-bottom facts about the external world which 
we know for certain, as, for example, the philosophical realist G. E. Moore 
thought, but because we reach some point beyond which our concepts become 
detached from: the criterion against which we measure what it means to know 
something does not exist; the criterion against which we measure what it means 
to know what it is to make a mistake about the existence of something ("I thought 
it existed, as for example, this does, but I made a mistake"); the criterion against 
which we measure what it means to doubt whether something is the case: 
The idealist's question would be something like this: "What right have I 
not to doubt  the existence of my hands?" (And to that the answer can't be: 
I know that they exist.) But someone who asks such a question is 
overlooking the fact that a doubt about existence only works within a 
language-game. Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such 
a doubt be like?, and don't understand this straight off. (Ibid., § 24) 
In what sense is it the case that "a doubt about existence only works within a 
language-game"? At OC § 52 Wittgenstein writes: 
[The] situation is not the same for a proposition like "At this distance from 
the sun there is a planet" and "Here is a hand" (namely my own hand). 
The second can't be called a hypothesis. But there isn't a sharp dividing 
line between them. 
But even though there is no sharp dividing line between them, it didn't 
follow, as Moore thought, that mistakes merely became increasingly 
improbable: 
For it is not true that a mistake merely gets more and more improbable as 
we pass from the planet to my own hand. No: at some point it has ceased 
to be conceivable. 
This is already suggested by the following: if it were not so, it would also 
be conceivable that we should be wrong in every statement about physical 
objects; that any we ever make are mistaken. (Ibid., § 54) 
Wittgenstein then considers this possibility: 
 
 
So is the hypothesis possible, that all the things around us don't exist? 
Would that not be like the hypothesis of our having miscalculated in all 
our calculations? 
His answer to this question is given in the next paragraph: 
When someone says: "Perhaps this planet doesn't exist and the light-
phenomenon arises in some other way", then after all one needs an 
example of an object which does exist. This doesn't exist, - as for example 
does .... (Ibid., § 56). 
Wittgenstein's point is that to be able to conceive of the concept of non-existence 
in this example presupposes that one has a criterion of existence against which to 
measure it. One cannot affirm the non-existence of something without first 
having a means of measurement of what it is the non-existence of this something 
would be ("This doesn't exist, - as for example does ...."). Only when one has a 
criterion of what this something existing is can one judge whether this something 
does not exist. The Cartesian sceptic's belief that one could be mistaken about the 
existence of everything one ordinarily took granted comes to grief for precisely 
the same reason. The idea of the possibility of making a mistake every time is 
incoherent because knowing what it is to make a mistake presupposes knowing 
what it is not to make a mistake. Otherwise, we could not know what it is to 
make a mistake. Thus given the concept of making a mistake it is not possible 
that we are not certain about some things. Otherwise, we have no bench-mark 
against which to measure what it is to make a mistake. 
Note what Wittgenstein is not saying. It is not that a person could not 
make a mistake, empirically speaking, every time! Wittgenstein accepts this as 
quite possible. His point is that knowing what it is not to make a mistake - 
knowing what it is to get it right - is presupposed even in this case just as it is in 
the case of someone who makes the occasional mistake. Otherwise we would 
have no criterion against which to measure his getting it wrong each time. 
Getting it wrong all the time presupposes a bench-mark of getting it right. In the 
Meditations Descartes uses the argument that one might be mistaken on every 
occasion about one's belief that there is a physical object (for example, a table) in 
front of one's eyes. In reality, being mistaken like this is no more powerful a 
proof for philosophical scepticism than being mistaken once.  
The same strategy of argument occurs towards the end of On Certainty. 
Wittgenstein writes: 
Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc. -they 
learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc. 
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. "Is there 
such a thing as a unicorn?" and so on. But such a question is possible only 
because as a rule no corresponding question presents itself. For how does 
 
 
one know how to set about satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns? 
How did one learn the method for determining whether something exists 
or not? (Ibid., § 476). 
One can only determine whether something exists or not (and therefore 
know what it is for something not to exist) if one already has a criterion - the 
means of measurement - of what it is something existing is. This of course is true 
of children who are very likely to go on and develop the relatively more 
sophisticated skill of asking about the existence of vampires, ghosts, aliens from 
outer space, legendary places, etc. The exchange  "Do you know the way to 
Xanadu?" "No, Xanadu does not exist." is a meaningful exchange only on the 
assumption that one already knows there are ‘things’ that do exist. It could not 
be a meaningful one if it made sense to answer "Do you know the way to 
London? with: "I'm not sure London exists (because I'm not sure the external 
world exists)." For in that case one could have no criterion against which to 
measure what it is for Xanadu not to exist. 
It is testimony to the importance Wittgenstein attaches to this argument 
that it is used in a similar epistemological context in   Zettel.8   Doubt is not a 
matter of will precisely because the distinction between getting the concept of 
doubt right and getting it wrong logically presupposes a pre-existing means of 
measurement, a metaphorical act of calibration on standard objects. Wittgenstein 
writes:  
How does it come about that doubt is not subject to arbitrary choice - And 
that being so - might not a child doubt everything because it was 
remarkably talented? (§ 409). 
 
A person can doubt only if he has learned certain things; as he can 
miscalculate only if he has learned to calculate. In that case it is indeed 
involuntary. (Ibid., § 410). 
 
Imagine a child was especially clever, so clever that he could at once be 
taught the doubtfulness of all things. So he learns from the beginning: 
"That is probably a chair." 
And now how does he learn the question: "Is it also really a chair?" (Ibid., § 
411). 
 
                                                 
88 Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1981). 
 
 
To begin by teaching someone "That looks red" makes no sense. For he 
must say that spontaneously once he has learnt what "red" means, i.e. has 
learned the technique of using the word. (Ibid., § 418). 
In other words, to teach someone "That looks red" presupposes the person knows 
what it is red is: "`It looks red to me.' - `and what is red like?' `Like this.' Here the 
right paradigm must be pointed to." (Ibid., § 420) "Why doesn't one teach a child 
the language-game "It looks red to me" from the first? Because it is not yet able to 
understand the rather fine distinction between seeming and being?" (Ibid., § 422) 
No, because it first has to know what it is red is in order to have something 
against which to measure what it is that looks red. The former is the condition of 
learning or successfully teaching the latter. Put otherwise: one can doubt whether 
something looks red only if one already knows what it is that is red; the latter is 
the criterion against which the former is measured. Therefore doubt is not and 
cannot be a function of the human will; doubt cannot be a matter of choice; in 
this sense one is not free to doubt. One cannot will to doubt because one cannot, 
as a matter of logic, doubt anything and everything. 
"If you tried to doubt everything you would not get so far as doubting 
anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty." ?" (Ibid., § 115) 
Certainty about what? Norman Malcolm attributes to Wittgenstein the view that: 
"Certain propositions belong to my `frame of reference'. If I had to give them up, 
I shouldn't be able to judge anything."9 As Wittgenstein puts it himself: "... the 
questions we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are 
exempt from doubt." (OC, § 341) Again, he writes: "To be sure, there is 
justification; but justification comes to an end." (Ibid., § 192) And again: "Doesn't 
testing come to an end?" (Ibid., § 164)  On G. E. Moore's claim to know certain 
fundamental facts such as he has two hands Wittgenstein writes:  "Moore does 
not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him." (Ibid., § 151) 
Examples of propositions Wittgenstein cites as `standing fast' are: `I know that I 
am a human being', `I know I have a brain' (Ibid., § 4), `The earth existed long 
before I was born' (Ibid., § 233), `I believe I have forebears, and that every human 
being has them'. (Ibid., § 234) The importance of such propositions is that they - 
or propositions like them - constitute the metaphorical means of measurement 
against which, and only against which, one's use of the concept of doubt can be 
measured for correct usage, can be measured in terms of getting it right as 
opposed to getting it wrong.   
Wittgenstein's key argument against philosophical scepticism, whether it 
be about  epistemology, or meaning itself, is that scepticism can only make sense 
                                                 
9 N. Malcolm, "The Groundlessness of Belief", in Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Reason and 
Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 74. 
 
 
against a pre-existing criterion of measurement or comparison. Philosophical 
scepticism is in error since it presupposes that one's judgements can make sense 
outside of such a criterion of measurement. Wittgenstein's critique  is, at bottom, 
based on the observation that, in the act of doubt or criticism, the philosophical 
sceptic attempts to ‘measure’ - criticise - a very distinctive object of measurement, 
namely: the object of measurement that constitutes the means of measurement, 
and therefore  a condition, of the meaningful employment the concept of doubt  
itself. In order to doubt, the sceptic must presuppose that which he or she 
doubts. The specific truths which the sceptical philosopher wishes to doubt are 
exactly what cannot be doubted, are exactly what must first be presupposed. 
This is essentially why Wittgenstein made a connection between meaning and 
teaching. When he asks, “Am I making the connection between meaning and 
teaching?” (Z § 411), the answer must be, absolutely! Teachability and by 
implication learnability – both closely linked to the concept of practice - is central 
to the later Wittgenstein’s account of meaning. Just as scepticism was only 
warranted in a context in which one could say what it would mean to be certain 
about something, scepticism or doubt as a conceptual skill could only be taught 
and learned after one has learned more basic conceptual skills regarding criteria 




DERRIDA’S ENDURING MOTIF OF ‘UNENDING’ DEFERRAL 
BETWEEN IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 
 
It is fair to say that Derrida never countenances such a structure or such a 
determinate origin in his approach to meaning. In contrast to the later 
Wittgenstein he presents a picture of a subject who is enfolded in language 
which he can neither oversee (nor control) nor escape. The Derridian insight into 
the illusions of the philosophies of "presence" opens the way to endless free play, 
unconstrained by a sense of allegiance beyond this freedom. Derridian 
deconstruction claims to undo certain hierarchical distinctions, such as that 
between abstraction and concrete experience, misreadings as against true 
readings, confusion versus clarity, and the like. The general method is to show 
that the traditionally privileged terms depends on, is a special case of, the 'lower' 
one, e.g. that all readings are misreadings. There is a Nietzschean background 
here, but here is also a liberationist attempt involved in it. The undermining of 
hierarchies seems to open up the possibilities for a world of equals. But the 
possibility of affirming such a world is undercut by the fact that deconstruction 
cannot come to an end: deferral of the end and endless play are everything. For 
 
 
Derrida there is nothing but deconstruction, which swallows up the old 
hierarchical distinctions between philosophy and literature, and between men 
and women, but just as readily could swallow up equal/unequal, 
community/discord, uncoerced/constrained dialogue, and the like. Nothing 
emerges from this flux worth affirming, and so what in fact comes to be 
celebrated is the deconstructing power itself, the prodigious power of 
subjectivity to undo all potential allegiances which might bind it and oppose 
pure untrammelled freedom.    
Put like this, it may be argued that Derrida's postmodernist philosophy 
implicitly attaches too much value  to the subjectivist self-celebration of the 
creative imagination: such celebration of the endlessly deferring creative self  
must mean endlessly deferral and, hence, moral default on the question of 
opposition to the coercive power of, for example,  Fascism. This is essentially a 
moral criticism. Terry Eagleton has made a similar criticism in his book The 
Illusions of Postmodernity.10 This seems to me far too simplistic. Derrida has a 
profound philosophical statement to make. What is fundamental to origin or the 
criterion or the measure or the paradigm-case of meaning is identity and 
difference simultaneously, irreducibly, non-simply then. This means 
deconstruction and differénce are unavoidable principles of philosophical 
enquiry. 
To say that everything exists “différantly” is to say that everything exists 
without hierarchy. Différance is the condition of being according to which “there 
is no experience of pure presence, but only chains of differential marks” 
(Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman [Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), 10).  Derrida expressed himself in terms of 
this neologism because it uniquely expressed the perspective that presence is 
always experienced as difference itself and defers to what is non-identical with 
itself and in relation to itself. Because of this Derrida held the deferral to be 
endless, and as a consequence classical equilibrium in ontology and 
epistemology was beyond our grasp, therefore impossible,. In answer to the 
question, whether différance is ‘the God of negative theology’, Derrida famously 
(or infamously) replied, “It is and it is not. It is above all not.”11 In other words 
différance is the condition of possibility both of difference and identity but 
                                                 
10 T  Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernity (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 1992),   32. 
11 ‘The Original Discussion of Différance’, in David Wood and Robert Bernasconi 
(eds), Derrida and Différance (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1985), 
p. 84. See also Derrida, ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’, trans. Ken Frieden, in 
Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (eds), Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 74. 
 
 
difference is not in a hierarchical relationship with identity where it occupies a 
subordinate position. Origin is characterized by identity and difference 
simultaneously: 
‘What we note as différance will thus be the movement of play that 
“produces” (and not by something that is simply an activity) these 
differences, these effects of difference. This does not mean that the 
différance which produces differences is before them in a simple and in 
itself unmodified and indifferent present. Différance is the non-full, non-
simple “origin”; it is the structured and differing origin of differences. 
(Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of 
Signs, trans. David B Allison. Preface by Newton Garver [Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973). 141). 
Origin can only exist as original identity and original difference. Derrida’s 
concept of the trace means that ‘words and concepts only receive meaning in 
sequences of differences’ (Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976], 70). Hence on the 
question of the origin of meaning Derrida says that ‘a meditation on the trace 
should teach us there is no origin, that is to say, simple origin; that the questions 
of origin carry with them a metaphysics of presence (Derrida, Of Grammatology, 
74). In terms of simple origin he quotes Antonin Artaud approvingly: ‘It is that 
there has never been an origin’ (Derrida, ‘The Theatre of Cruelty and the Closure 
of Representation, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978] 292). Hence, insofar as 
origin coincides with identity it cannot shut out original difference. In Writing 
and Difference, in his essay on Hegel and Bataille, he writes: 
It is not a question of subordinating the slidings and differences of 
discourse, the play of syntax, to the entirety of an anticipated discourse. 
On the contrary. If the play of difference is indispensable for the correct 
reading of the general economy’s concepts, and if each must be 
reinscribed within the law of its own sliding and must be related to the 
sovereign operation, one must not make of these requirements a 
subordinate moment of a structure. […] … one must not submit 
contextual attentiveness and differences of signification to a system of 
meaning permitting or promising an absolute formal mastery (Derrida 
‘From Restricted to General Economy‘, Writing and Difference, 345).  
Finally and famously Derrida writes in the essay ‘Différance’: 
Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy 
is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see 
opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms 
must appear as the différance of the other, as the other different and 
 
 
deferred in the economy of the same… (Derrida, ‘Différance’ Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. and annotation, Alan Bass [Brighton: Harvester Press; 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982]’ 17). 
A metaphysics of presence is a hierarchical structure with subordinate categories 
of one kind or another. Derrida opposes this possibility unconditionally. 
Wittgenstein seems to say that without hierarchical structure – without presence 
of this kind - doubt is impossible and by extension teaching and learning is 
impossible. The teaching and learnability conditions of meaning require 
structure and presence.   
 
 
WIITGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA: A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE? 
 
In other words, according to Wittgenstein one cannot collapse hierarchies in the 
way Derridian deconstruction proposes.  Wittgenstein's argument against 
Descartes is essentially, that in the realm of language, hierarchies that undermine 
the Cartesian ego are unavoidable.. This seems directly to contradict Derrida. 
Derrida  says that there are no hierarchies, hence no hierarchies of the form 
is/seems to be or is/is probably. Wittgenstein says that unless there are 
hierarchies of the form is/seems to be and is/is probably, a child could not learn 
the meaning of 'probably' or 'seems to be'. But since a child does learn these 
differences – and learning these differences depend on hierarchies - Derrida must 
be mistaken in some way. 
That child-learning must conform to just such a sequence of events (the 
meaning of 'is' is learned before 'seems to be') is not a law to be corroborated by 
empirical observation. Rather, it demonstrates a purely conceptual point, which 
is: to teach the meaning of, for example, 'seems to be' in any context other than 
one in which 'is'  has already been taught is  necessarily not to have taught the 
meaning of 'seems to be' (whatever it is one has taught, it is not the meaning of 
this phrase). In other words, in the area of child-learning in which Wittgenstein 
connects meaning with learnability, identity must logically (and hence 
developmentally) precede difference. In other words, contra Derrida,  
Wittgenstein may affirm difference but he cannot affirm non-hierarchy. There 
exists a kind of genetic epistemology in the later philosophy that has parallels 
with Piaget’s theories of child development in which certain principles have first 
to be in place before one can attempt to master the next stage. The inscription 
that Wittgenstein had intended to preface the Investigations, King Lear’s  ‘I’ll teach 
you differences’ is not meant to challenge the ontological and epistemological 
priority of truth over false, certainty over doubt, ‘is’ versus ‘appears to be’ (the 
case). It is intended precisely to highlight differences that in a learnability context 
 
 
necessarily originate in identity. That is: a child can learn the conceptual skill 
characterized by ‘what seems to be the case’ only if he or she have first learned 
the conceptual skill of ‘what is the case.’ In a slightly different vein Donald 
Davidson held that communication and interpretation is impossible unless most 
of our beliefs are true. This of course is why it has been pointed out many times 
that the very possibility understanding Derrida’s philosophy presupposes the 
priority of identity over difference (so for example one of the principles 
communication depends on is ‘not both A and not-A [-(A & -A)], the principle of 
non-contradiction; otherwise it breaks down rather radically when applies to any 
assertion at all anyone makes).   
That Wittgenstein rejects non-hierarchy then is clear enough. What is not 
so clear whether he also holds that hierarchy necessarily contradicts endless 
deferral.  Clearly some measure of deferral is not inconsistent with the presence 
of hierarchy:  there is a clear sense in which one can say in the Derridian idiom 
that one defers from 'seems to be' to 'is'.  Endless deferral is another matter. In On 
Certainty, as we have seen, Wittgenstein seems to conclude as regards 
epistemological problems that necessarily `Justification comes to an end'. In other 
words, in the realm of epistemology it would seem that he is not only against 
non-hierarchy but also against endless deferral. In the remarks taken from Zettel 
on the matter of language-learning per se, it is again clear that Wittgenstein rejects 
non-hierarchy; it is less obvious whether he would  exclude endless deferral 
unless it is shown that it precludes teachability and learnability per se. That 'is' is 
superordinate to 'seems to be' does not necessarily exclude deferral beyond 'is.' 
Or at least one cannot known this  a priori. More significantly, one cannot second-
guess what initial conceptual conditions are necessary and/or sufficient to reach 
the outcome where a child can use the concept ‘is’ correctly. In this sense 
normative epistemology may not be a universal model of language-learning 
itself. As long as teachability and learnability are not in principle precluded by an 
endless chain of deferral there is little practical use in pronouncing 
unconditionally on this issue. To be sure, in order to demonstrate to the 
Cartesian sceptic the error of their ways Wittgenstein has to posit both the 
necessary presence of hierarchy and an end to epistemic deferral; but as regards 
language-learning it is a moot point whether he has to affirm the end of deferral 
once one reaches the meaning of, for example "This is red". His position on 
language-learning would seem to entail that any such deferral beyond this point 
would of necessity face at least one constraint: any deferral that undermined 
hierarchy would be impermissible. But this does not of itself rule out something 
akin to endless deferral. To repeat: in order to refute the Cartesian sceptic, it is 
sufficient for Wittgenstein to claim that there is a hierarchy involved in is/seems 
to be or is/probably is; he does not have to claim that 'justification comes to an 
 
 
end'  as regards teaching of learning the meaning of the demonstrative sentence, 





CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
 
What should we conclude about the relation between Descartes, Wittgenstein, 
and Derrida as regards the history of ideas? Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as 
Brian McGuinness puts it, ‘exposes the weaknesses of traditional philosophies by 
a method which is itself a subtle differentiation of traditional philosophy.’12 If one 
can take for granted Descartes as a representative of early modern philosophy, 
this would seem to imply that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a merely (though this 
should not be taken in any pejorative sense) a phenomenon of late modernity. 
His philosophical technique is decidedly not post-modern.  That is, Wittgenstein 
uses rational argument of a qualitatively different kind from Descartes' to refute 
him. He does not dispense with philosophical criticism per se but uses it to show 
that certain truths are exempt from philosophical criticism. This understanding 
of Wittgenstein would seem to concur with my own conclusions in this paper.  
What makes Wittgenstein and Descartes modern is that both affirm hierarchy. 
The fundamental difference between the two thinkers is the direction of 
hierarchy.  Essentially, Wittgenstein reverses Descartes' hierarchy. This is not an 
original conclusion but it is worth rehearsing in the context of my argument. In 
his Meditations Descartes wrote: 
... I am the same being who senses, that is to say who apprehends and 
knows things, as by the sense-organs, since in truth I see light, hear noise 
and feel heat. But it will be said that I am dreaming. Let it be so; all the 
same, at least it is very certain that it seems to me that I see light, hear a 
noise, feel heat; and this is properly what in me is called perceiving ....13 
An idea is "that which the mind directly perceives".14 Consequently, though one 
has incorrigible knowledge of one's own inner mental phenomena, one does not 
                                                 
12 B F McGuinness, "Editor's Preface", McGuinness (ed), Wittgenstein and His 
Times, iii. 
13 Descartes, Meditations II, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1968) 
107. 
14 Descartes, `Reply to the Third Set of Objections to the Meditations', No 5. 
Quoted in A Kenny, "Descartes on Ideas" in W Doney, Descartes, (New York, 
MacMillan, 1967), 239. 
 
 
have such knowledge of the external world. Descartes aimed to show `how it is 
easier to know the mind than the body': "I see a tree" can be doubted without 
contradiction but not "I seem to see a tree". The argument is that what is certain is 
what seems to be the case - and that what is less certain - what is the case - can 
only be made certain if it is derived from (or presupposed by) the former.  The 
error of this, according to Wittgenstein, is that it posits an impossible hierarchy, a 
hierarchy that does not and cannot be realised in any language but an 
unlearnable one.  In essence, Descartes puts things the wrong way round. It is 
not possible to take as one's point of departure what seems to be the case , and 
from that point to attempt to derive what is the case. Rather, what it is x is  is the 
criterion against which to measure what  it is seems to be x is. If you like, in a 
certain sense the objective is the criterion against which the subjective must be 
measured. 
Hierarchy seems to be a defining characteristic of modern thought, non-
hierarchy a defining moment of post-modern thought. In the context of 
epistemology both Wittgenstein and Descartes affirm hierarchy or structure.  But 
if we put this in the language of foundationalism there is a difference: Descartes 
is a  factual foundationalist and Wittgenstein is a conceptual foundationalist. 
Descartes doubts everything until he arrives at a rock-bottom fact about which 
he cannot have the slightest doubt - his own existence as a thinking thing. 
Wittgenstein argues that in order to doubt in the first place certain truths must 
already be in place, otherwise the concept of doubt would be an empty one. In 
contrast an enduring philosophical motif of Derrida is the rejection of hierarchy 
and structure, and by implication the repudiation of the presence of simple 
origin. As regards hierarchy then, it does not take much to work out that we have 
two moderns (one early and one late) and one post-modern. Clearly both 
Wittgenstein and Descartes reject endless deferral in the context of epistemology. 
It is on the matter of the ‘linguistic turn’ in twentieth-century philosophy that 
things are more complicated. It is not obvious that even while espousing 
hierarchy in the field of language-learning Wittgenstein would reject endless 
deferral (Derrida I think it is fair to say would be enthusiastic about its presence). 
In other words, it is not clear whether foundations of the kind predicated of 
epistemology have a similar necessary role to play in meaning.  
 
